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I. INTRODUCTION
The phrase "Roman law" conjures warm images in the
mind of every true civilian believer. The greatest possible attain-
ment of a medieval jurist-becoming a doctor utriusque iura
(doctor of both laws, canon and secular, Christian and
Roman)-has been replaced by learning in both ancient and
modem law. Modem scholars are excited when they see vestiges
of Roman law in modem codes. When such vestiges are discov-
* Judicial clerk to the Honorable John M. DuhE Jr., United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. B.A., Yale College, 1988; J.D., Tulane University, 1991. I would like
to thank Professors A.N. Yiannopoulos and Shael Herman of Tulane Law School for their
valuable insights into both Roman and Louisiana law, and I am grateful to Professor Peter
Stein of Queens' College, Cambridge for reading a draft of this Article and offering many
helpful suggestions.
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ered, grand civilian pretensions to being heirs to the Roman law
are legitimized.
The law relating to possession in the Louisiana Digest of
1808, commonly called the Civil Code of 1808,1 affords Louisi-
ana a serious claim as a middle-aged pretender. Concededly, the
Code is heavily influenced by Spanish law; Louisiana had been a
Spanish colony only a few years earlier. Louisiana also had been
a French colony for some time, and the influence of French law
was strong too. The Code of 1808 was written shortly after the
Code Napol6on of 1804, and the Louisiana legislation took
advantage of the work done by the French redactors.2 There has
been a great deal of debate over the relative influence of the
French and Spanish sources on the Code of 1808,3 but that dis-
pute is of relatively little concern here. In the area of possession,
Louisiana followed Rome, not Spain or France.
Both the French and the Spanish have their own preten-
sions to the heirship of Rome, and Louisiana's claim would be
tarnished if it admitted receiving the Roman law via those inter-
mediate sources. Through the possession articles, Louisiana can
make the case that it took in its own right from Rome. Proving
that case is the purpose of this Article. The argument will be
made in three parts.
First, a close textual analysis of the articles in the Code of
1808 and the parallel provisions of the Institutes of Justinian
1. This Article will refer to this source as the Code of 1808, following general usage.
2. The essential dates in early Louisiana history can be summarized as follows: In
1682, Robert Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle claimed Louisiana on behalf of France. New
Orleans was founded in 1718, and Louisiana became a French crown colony in 1731.
France transferred Louisiana to Spain by the Family Compact of the secret Treaty of Fon-
tainebleau in 1762, although the Spanish did not take possession until 1769. Louisiana
remained Spanish until 1800, when it was transferred back to France. This time the
French were delayed in taking possession; France ruled Louisiana for only twenty days in
1803, when Louisiana was sold to the United States as part of the Louisiana Purchase. In
1812, Louisiana was admitted as a state in the Union. See, e.g., Rodolfo Batiza, Origins of
Modern Codification of the Civil Law, 56 TUL. L. REv. 477, 579-82, 589 (1982); A.N.
Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, in LA. CIV. CODE at xxiii-xxvii (West 1992).
3. Compare Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REv. 4 (1971) [hereinafter Batiza, Actual Sources] and
Rodolfo Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, Facts and Speculation: A Rejoinder, 46
TUL. L. R . 628 (1972) with Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to
Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972). For additional discussion, see Joseph M.
Sweeney, Tournament of Scholars over the Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, 46 TUL. L.
REV. 585 (1972); Yiannopoulos, supra note 2, at xxiii, xxvii-xxx. See also A REPRINT OF
MOREAU LISLET'S COPY OF A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS Now IN FORCE IN THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS (photo. reprint 1971) (1808 de la Vergne volume).
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(which are largely taken from Gaius4) reveals that the Code
tracks the Institutes. The Siete Partidas also follow the Insti-
tutes, and the question arises whether Louisiana received its
Roman law in this area through the Siete Partidas or from the
Institutes themselves. The conclusion is that the Louisiana
redactors5 may have consulted the Spanish law, but they did not
always elect to follow it and instead chose to follow the Insti-
tutes directly. Louisiana wins its claim by a preponderance of
the evidence in the first phase of its case.
In the second phase, this Article explains the rudiments of
the Roman law of possessio, including possessory protection in
the form of interdicta, as well as modes of acquiring ownership,
such as usucapio and occupatio.6  As these concepts are
explained, their Louisiana counterparts will be examined for
similarities, or actual copying. This exposition will set the stage
for the third phase of the argument, which will show how the
basic understanding of possession in Louisiana law, particularly
under the Code of 1808 and the Code of Practice of 1825,1 fol-
lowed traditional Roman thinking when addressing problematic
issues of possession law. The conclusion is that Louisiana can
claim to take from the Roman tradition in its own right, at least
in the area of possession law. While in other areas the State
must claim through the French or the Spanish, in the field of
possession its claim is equal to the claims of France and Spain.
Before the argument itself can begin, some basic concepts
need to be defined. The word "possession" is used in a number
of senses under the current Louisiana regime8 and under older
regimes in Louisiana and other jurisdictions. A person might be
said colloquially to "possess" a book borrowed from the library,
but that person would not possess the book in the proper, juridi-
4. See, eg., W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson, Introduction to THE INSMaUTES OF
GAIUs 7, 14 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans., 1988). For instance, the provisions of
Justinian concerning the occupatio of wild animals, see Table infra, are taken from G. Inst.
2.67.
5. The redactors of the Code of 1808 were James Brown and Louis Moreau Lislet,
and the redactors of the Code of Practice of 1825 were Moreau Lislet, Pierce Derbigny, and
Edward Livingston. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 2, at xxvii, xxxi.
6. For the sake of distinguishing verbally between the Roman law and later law, this
Article will use Latin terms when they are not overly burdensome (i.e., when the Latin
words are cognates with English). For instance, when referring to the Roman law of pos-
session, the word "possessio" will be used.
7. The history of the various civil codes of Louisiana has been amply discussed else-
where. See generally Yiannopoulos, supra note 2 (collecting and discussing authorities).
8. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Possession, 51 LA. L. REv. 523, 523-24 (1991).
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cal sense. Used in its proper sense, "possession" means the exer-
cise of physical control over a thing9 with the requisite intent-
such as the intent to own the thing. The "possessor" of the
library book is not a possessor in the proper sense because the
intent element is missing: he exercises physical control over the
book because he has borrowed it, not because he has any pre-
tense to having it for himself.
Exactly what intent is required at Roman law is the subject
of some controversy, and this issue will be addressed below.10
Some element of intent was certainly required; the only question
is the quality of the intent. Exercise of physical control without
the requisite intent is mere "detention." This Article will
attempt to use these terms strictly, although the law itself some-
times confuses the concepts, leading to potential confusion in
interpretation.
Further, the reader should not confuse ownership and pos-
session. According to Ulpian's ancient Roman maxim, "Owner-
ship has nothing in common with possession."" This is perhaps
an overstatement and should not be taken literally, but the two
concepts are nevertheless separate. The Louisiana redactors
understood this, stating in the Code of 1808:
Although the possession be naturally linked with the < owner-
ship>, yet they may subsist separately from each other, for it
often happens that the <ownership> of a thing being contro-
verted between two persons, there is one of the two who is
<recognized> to be possessor, and it may be that it is the
person who is not the right owner, and that thus the possession
may be separated from the <ownership>.1 2
9. "Thing" is a technical legal term. A "thing" for the purposes of this Article may
be defined simply as something that can be the subject of property rights.
10. See infra section III.C.1.
11. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 107 (1962).
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.20 (1808). The words in angle brackets are my transla-
tion of the official French, for 'propriiti" and "reconnue." I translate them as "owner-
ship" and "recognized," respectively. The official English translation uses "property" and
"owned," respectively, which is possibly inaccurate in twentieth-century English, and cer-
tainly confusing. I believe my translation is just as appropriate, if not more so. See CEN-
TRE DE RECHERCHE EN DROIT PRIVA & COMPARA DU QUEBEC, LEXIQUE DE DROIT PRIVf-
49 (1988).
I have used angle brackets throughout this Article to give more appropriate transla-
tions than appear in the official English version. Translations of early Louisiana law from
French into English are notoriously inadequate. The French in these early laws is control-
ling when the English is incorrect. See, e.g., Shelp v. National Sur. Corp., 333 F.2d 431,
437-38 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J.) (translations were "spectacularly bad"), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964).
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Possession sometimes can lead to ownership through means
such as occupatio, praescriptio, or usucapio. The relation of pos-
session to ownership is important, but it is only a relation; the
two are not identical. Praesciptio and usucapio will be dis-
cussed below. 13 Likewise, occupatio, although it is an outgrowth
of possession, is a means of acquiring ownership. It is intimately
related to possession, however, and this Article will treat the
subject in some detail, particularly because the similarity in lan-
guage of the Roman and Louisiana law is so striking.
II. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
The most obvious way in which the early Louisiana law of
possession is heir to the Roman law is in the language of some of
the provisions of the Code of 1808. This Part of the Article
exposes this language as it compares with older Roman sources.
The following Table fists some of the parallel articles of the Lou-
isiana Code of 1808 (on the left) and of the Institutes of Justinian
(on the right), which date from the sixth century of the Common
Era. 14 When the provisions are seen side by side, the influence of
the Institutes is dramatic.
13. See infra section III.B.3.
14. The following provisions are from LA. Civ. CODE arts. 3.20.4-.6, .8-.9, .13
(1808), and J. INST. 2.1.12, .15-.16, .18, .48. The translations for Justinian's Institutes
throughout this Article will be from the 1987 edition of Peter Birks and Grant McLeod,
unless otherwise noted. When the original French or Latin indicates a less-than-perfect
translation or shows a closer parallel between the two texts, the relevant original language
is shown parenthetically.
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TABLE OF SOME CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS IN THE
LOUISIANA CODE OF 1808 AND THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN
Code of 1808
Art. 4. Wild beasts, birds
and all the animals which are
bred in the sea, the air, or
upon the earth, do, as soon as
they are taken, become
instantly by the law of nations,
the property of the captor; for
it is agreeable to natural
reason, that those things
which have no owner, should
become the property of the
first occupant.
And it is not material
whether they are taken by a
man upon his own ground or
upon the ground of another.
But yet it is certain that
whoever has entered into the
ground of another for the sake
of hunting or fowling, might
have been prohibited from
entering by the proprietor of
the ground if he had foreseen
the intent.
Wild beasts are those who
enjoy their natural liberty and
go.wherever they please.
Art. 5. Wild beasts and
fowls when taken are esteemed
to be the property of the
captor as long as they
continue in his custody but
when they have once escaped
and recovered their natural
liberty, the right of the captor
ceases and they become the
property of the first who seizes
them:
Justinian's Institutes
12. Wild animals, birds and
fish, the creatures of land, sea
and sky, become the property
of the taker as soon as they
are caught. Where something
has no owner, it is reasonable
that the person who takes it
should have it.
It is immaterial whether
he catches the wild animal or
bird on his own land or
someone else's. Suppose a
man enters someone else's
land to hunt or to catch
birds. If the landowner sees
him, he can obviously warn
him off.
If you catch such an animal it
remains yours so long as you
keep it under your control. If
it escapes your control and
recovers its natural liberty, it
ceases to be yours. The next
taker can have it.
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and they are understood to
have recovered their natural
liberty, if they have run or
flown out of sight, and even if
they are not out of sight, when
it happens that they cannot
without difficulty, be pursued
and retaken.
Art. 6. Peacocks and
pigeons are considered as wild
beasts, though after every
flight it is their custom to
return;
and with regard to these
animals which go and return
customarily, the rule to be
observed is that they are
understood to be yours as long
as they appear to retain an
inclination to return: but if
this inclination ceases, they
cease to be yours and will
again become the property of
them who take them.
And these animals seem
then to cease to have an
inclination to return when
they disuse of returning during
a certain time (lorsqu'ils ont
cessd de revenir pendant un
certain tems [sic]).
It is held to have regained its
natural freedom when it is
out of your sight or when,
though still in sight, it is
difficult for you to reach it.
15. Peacocks and pigeons
are wild by nature. It is
immaterial that their habit is
usually to keep flying off and
coming back. Bees do that
too and there is no doubt that
they are wild. Some people
also keep deer so
domesticated that they
regularly go back and forth to
the woods. Nobody suggests
that they are not wild by
nature.
There is a special rule for
these animals which come
and go: they stay yours so
long as they keep their
homing instinct. It is only
when they lose it that they
stop being yours. They then
vest in the next taker.
They are judged to lose the
homing instinct when they
stop coming back.
1992] 1859
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Art 8. Chickens, turkeys,
geese, ducks and other
domestic animals, shall not be
considered as wild beasts,
though there are species of
these animals which exist in a
state of natural liberty.
Therefore if the geese or
fowls of any body, should take
flight, they are nevertheless
reckoned to belong to him, in
whatever place they are found
although he shall have lost
sight of them; and whoever
detains such animals, with a
lucrative view, is understood
to commit a theft.
Art. 9. Those who
discover or who will find
precious stones, pearls and
other things of that kind on
the sea shore, or other places
where it is lawful for them to
search for them and to take
them, become masters of them.
Art. 13. We must not
reckon in the number of things
relinquished, those which one
has lost, nor that which is
thrown into the sea, in a
danger of shipwreck, to save
the vessel, nor those which are
lost in a shipwreck. For
although the owners of these
things lose the possession of
them, yet they retain the
<ownership> and the right
to recover them (car encore,
qui les maflres de ces effets en
perdent la possession, ils en
conservent la propridt, et le
droit de les recouvrer).
16. Ducks and geese are not
wild by nature. That is
apparent from the existence
of separate wild species.
If your ducks or geese are
disturbed and fly off, they
stay yours wherever they are,
even when out of your sight.
Anyone who takes such
animals with intent to gain
commits theft (et qui lucrandi
animo ea animalia retinet,
furtum committere
intellegitur).
18. Stones and gems and so
on found on the sea-shore
immediately become the
finder's by the law of nature.
48. It is different with things
thrown overboard in a storm
to lighten ship. They
continue to belong to their
owners. They are definitely
not thrown away with the
intention to be rid of them
but to help both owner and
ship escape the dangers of the
sea.
[Vol. 661860
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Thus those who find things of Anyone who finds them
this kind, cannot make driven ashore by the waves or
themselves masters of them, still on the sea commits theft
but are obliged to restore them if he takes them with intent
to their lawful owners in the to gain. Such things are in
manner provided for by the much the same position as
special laws made on that those which drop out of
subject. moving vehicles without their
owners' knowledge.
The construction of these provisions demonstrates the influ-
ence of the Roman law of occupatio on the early Louisiana law
of occupancy. 15 The question remains, however, whether the
Roman law was received into Louisiana through the filters of
other intermediate laws, promulgated between ancient times and
the nineteenth century. French and Spanish sources are the two
chief contenders for the honor of being the transmitter of
Roman law. Each will be examined in turn.
The chief advocate for the French has been Professor
Batiza 1 6 Even he has not found French sources for most of the
15. A few asides about the provisions reproduced above are in order here. The law of
physical things (or property) is separate under the Roman (and Louisiana) scheme from the
law of obligations. While a landowner may have no action under a property theory against
another who kills game on his land, the hunter may have committed a delict, and the
landowner could recover under that theory. The point of the property law is that the
hunter would gain title to the wild animal through occupatio or occupancy, unless the
landowner had reduced the wild animal to possession (e.g., by putting it in a pen).
NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 131. But see FRIEDRICH K. VON SAVIGNY, DAS RECHT DES
BESrrzEs: EINE CIVILISTISCHE ABHANDLUNG (7th ed. Vienna Gerold's sohn 1865). One
of the chief theses of Savigny's treatise is that the law of possession is part of the law of
obligations. His theory is that possessory protection was based on the possessory interdict,
which was based on a delictual obligation of the person who disturbed or evicted the pos-
sessor by "an illegal act in point of form." SAVIGNY, TREATISE ON POSSESSION OR THE
JUS POSSESSIONIS OF THE CIVIL LAW 6-7, 21-23 (Erskine Perry trans., 6th ed. London, S.
Sweet 1848) [hereinafter SAVIGNY]. Perry's translation will be used throughout this Arti-
cle instead of the original German version.
J. INST. 2.1.13, which is omitted above, is a didactic provision. Justinian's Institutes
were intended to be a course book for law students. Thus, the Louisiana redactors may
have declined to include a provision such as this one. It reads:
Does an animal become yours when it is wounded and ready to be caught? Some
jurists thought it became yours at once and stayed yours till you gave up the
chase, only then becoming available again to the next taker. Others thought that
it became yours only when you caught it. We confirm that view. After all, many
things can happen to stop you catching the animal.
Anyone with an interest in the Roman law concerning this particular subject should
see generally Grant McLeod, Wild and Tame Animals and Birds in Roman Law, in NEw
PERSPECTIVES IN THE ROMAN LAW OF PROPERTY 169 (Peter Birks ed., 1989).
16. See sources cited supra note 3.
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articles quoted above. 7 What Professor Batiza did find was that
the French Projet of the Year VIII 8 was a "substantial influ-
ence" on article 13, as was the corresponding article of the Code
Napol6on, article 717.19 That the Louisiana redactors followed
Justinian's legislation instead of the French, however, can be
seen from reading article 717 of the Code Napol6on: "Claims
respecting property thrown into the sea, respecting objects
which the sea casts up, of whatever nature so ever they may be,
over plants and herbage which grow on the banks of the sea, are
also regulated by particulr [sic] laws."2 The structure and lan-
guage of the Louisiana article in the 1808 Code match the Insti-
tutes much more closely than they approximate the article in the
Napoleonic Code.
The other possible French influence on the above-quoted
articles is Pothier. According to Professor Batiza, Pothier had
an influence on articles 2 and 3 of the 1808 Louisiana Code. The
cited provision of Pothier states:
Occupancy is the title by which one acquires ownership of
a thing that belongs to no one, when one lays hold of it with the
idea of acquiring it.
We will see, in a first article, which are the things that
belong to no one, ownership of which may be acquired by the
first taker; we will see shortly the different types of occupancy,
which are hunting, fishing, fowling, invention, and simple
occupancy. 21
The second paragraph just quoted does appear to have influ-
17. See Batiza, Actual Sources, supra note 3, at 130.
18. Id. (construing Projet de Code Civil, pr6sent6 par la Commission nomne par le
gouvernement le 24 Thermidor, an VIII, art. II, penultimate par. (1800)).
19. Id.
20. CODE NAPOLifON art. 717, 1 (1804).
21. ROBERT J. PoTHiER, TRAITA DU DROIT DU DOMAINE DE PROPRIult P. 1, 2, § 1,
n.20, 18 (nouvelle ed. 1807) (citations omitted) (my translation). The full text of this note
in French is as follows:
L"occupation est le titre par lequel on acquiert le domaine de propriitd d'une
chose qui n'appartient d personne, en s'en emparant dans le dessein de l'acqudrir:
Quod enim nullius est dit Gaius,-id ratione naturali occupanti conceditur. L 3,
f de acq. rer. Dom.
Nous verrons, dans un premier article, quelles sont les choses qui
n 'appartiennent d personne, dont le domaine de propriitd peut dtre acquis par le
premier occupant; nous parcourrons ensuite les diffdrentes especes d'occupations,
qui sont la chasse, la pche, l'oisellerie, l'invention et l'occupation simplement dit&
Comme la chasse mdrite un article particulier, ellefera la matire du second
article; nous traiterons de la peche et de l'oisellerie dans un troisieme; dans un
quatridme, de l'invention; dans un cinquieme, de l'occupation simplement dite.
Id I regret not having access to the second edition of Pothier from 1781, cited by Profes-
1862 [Vol. 66
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enced article 3 of the 1808 Code, which states: "[T]here are five
ways of acquiring <ownership> by occupancy, to wit: By
hunting; By fowling; By fishing; By invention (finding) that is by
discovering precious stones on the seashore or things abandoned
or a treasure; By captures from the enemy."2 2 Pothier is an
undoubtedly important influence on the 1808 Code.2 3  But
Pothier, at least for a number of other articles, is not the main
transmitter of the Roman tradition for the occupancy articles in
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808. The redactors must have
relied on the Institutes directly, or on some other source. The
French claim as intermediary is weak in the area of possession.
Having disposed of the French claims, Louisiana must next
address the stronger Spanish claim. Batiza notes that the Siete
Partidas were a "substantial influence" 24 on some of the same
articles of the 1808 Code that appear to follow Justinian's Insti-
tutes. For instance, as shown in the Table above, article 3.20.4
of the 1808 Code is largely a verbatim translation of Justinian's
Institutes 2.1.12. Yet article 3.20.4 also resembles a provision of
the Siete Partidas:
Wild beasts, and birds, the fish of the sea and rivers,
become the property of him who catches them, as soon as they
are in his possession, whether he took them on his own, or on
another's estate. Yet when any one is about to enter upon the
estate of another to hunt, and finds the owner there, who for-
bids him to enter for that purpose; if he nevertheless enters and
catches game; it will not belong to the hunter, but to the owner
of the estate. For no man has a right to enter upon the lands of
another, to hunt, or for any other purpose, when he is forbid-
den by the owner. And so it would be, if the owner had found
him already hunting upon his estate, and forbid him to hunt
sor Batiza, particularly because that edition might have been the one used by the redactors
of the Code of 1808.
22. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3.20.3 (1808). The French version reads: "II y a cinq
manieres d'acquerlr ainsi par occupation, savoir: La chasse aux b'tes fauves; La chasse d
l'oiseau; Lapiche;L invention, c'est-d-dire, lorsqu'on trouve desperles sur le bord de lamer,
des choses abandonnies, ou un trdsor; Le butin que l'on fait sur les ennemis. " Id.
23. Pothier, as well as Domat, had an impact on many possession articles not under
discussion in this paper because they are not part of the direct Roman influence. See
Batiza, Actual Sources, supra note 3, at 130-33. See generally 1 JEAN DOMAT, LEs Loix
CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL, (Paris, Durand 1777); ROBERT J. POTHIER,
TRAIT DE LA POSSESSION (nouvelle ed. 1807); ROBERT J. POTHIER, TRArr DE LA PRE-
SCRIPTION QUI RtSULTE DE LA POSSESSION (nouvelle ed. 1807); POTHIER, supra note 21.
Again, I regret not having access to any of the second editions of Pothier from 1781. See
supra note 21.
24. Batiza, Actual Sources, supra note 3, at 130.
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there any more: for all the game he might afterwards take,
would belong to the owner and not to him. But if before he
had been thus forbidden by the owner, he had taken any game,
it would belong to him, and the owner would have no claim
whatever to it.25
While the resemblance between this law of the Siete Partidas and
the corresponding Louisiana article is apparent, the purpose of
the law in the Siete Partidas is different. Instead of appearing
under the title on possession or occupancy, it is part of the title
"Of the Dominion of Things." Its chief concern is ownership of
the land, and the rights of the landowner, rather than the rights
of the person attempting to gain ownership of game through
possession under the laws of occupancy. Because the redactors
of the 1808 Code focused article 3.20.4 on possession and occu-
pancy, rather than the rights of the landowner, it seems safe to
conclude that they used Justinian's Institutes as the source for
the article, instead of law 17. The redactors may have looked at
the provision in the Partidas, but in the end they chose to follow
Rome rather than Spain.
In other provisions of the Siete Partidas, however, the Span-
ish follows the language and the purpose of the Roman law more
closely. Law 19 provides, under the title "How a man loses the
dominion or property he has in birds and wild beasts," as
follows:
A man loses the dominion of property he had acquired in
birds, wild beasts, and fish, in the manner mentioned... imme-
diately they escape from his power and return to the state in
which they were before taken: or when they go off so far as not
to be seen; or if seen, are so far off, as not to be retaken without
difficulty. In either of these Cases, they will become the prop-
erty of him who first takes them.26
This provision looks almost exactly the same as both the corre-
sponding article in the Code of 1808 and the corresponding sec-
25. 1 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, partida third, tit. XXVIII, law 17 (L. Moreau Lislet &
Henry Carleton trans., New Orleans, James McKaraher 1820). This translation was com-
missioned by the Louisiana Legislature because a large portion of the Siete Partidas was in
force in Louisiana at the time. Id at iii (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1819, reprinted in SYMEON
SYMEONIDES, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 189-90 (4th
ed. 1988)). The relevant provisions of the Siete Partidas appear in the Spanish in 2 LAS
SIETE PARTIDAS DEL SABIo REY (photo. reprint 1974) (Gregorio Lopez ed., Salamanca
1555) [hereinafter the SIETE PARTIDAS will be cited simply as SiETE PARTIDAS, followed
by the appropriate partida, title, and law numbers].
26. SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 25, partida third, tit. XXVIII, law 19.
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tion in the Institutes. The source of these laws in the Siete
Partidas is the same as that of the 1808 Code, and in some
instances, the Siete Partidas track the Roman law more closely
than the Louisiana law does. For example, the Institutes state:
Bees are... wild by nature. If they swarm in your tree they
are not yours till you manage to contain them. They are in the
same position as birds nesting in the same tree. If another per-
son hives them, he becomes their owner. Also, anyone can take
their honey, if they have made any. If you see someone coming
on your land, you can obviously stop him before anything is
done. A swarm which leaves your hive remains yours while it
is within your sight and can be followed without difficulty.
Otherwise someone else can take it. 7
The parallel law in the Siete Partidas provides:
Bees are considered as naturally wild. We therefore say,
that though a swarm of them, light upon a tree belonging to
any person, yet he cannot say they are his own, until he has
confined them in a hive, or other thing. And so it would be
with birds that light there; he could not claim them, until he
had caught them. And so we say it would be with the honey-
comb which bees make upon a tree belonging to any person, it
would not, on that account, belong to him, until he had taken
possession of it, and conveyed it away. For if any other person
come first, and take it away, it will belong to him; unless the
owner of the tree were present when he came and forbade him.
We also say, that if a swarm of bees fly away from a man's hive,
so that he lose sight of them; or if they go to so great a distance,
that he can neither retake nor follow them; he will then lose his
property in them and they will belong to the first person who
takes and confines them.2"
The Louisiana law entirely omits this intricate discussion of bees
and their honey.29 And while the Siete Partidas provide for
hens, capons, cows, ewes, mares, and she-asses,3 0 both the Insti-
tutes and the 1808 Code ignore these animals. The Louisiana
27. J. INsT. 2.1.14.
28. SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 25, partida third, tit. XXVIII, law 22.
29. Despite the omission from the Louisiana law, bees seem to hold a curious fascina-
tion for civilian lawyers. See, eg., E.J. Cohn, Bees and the Law, 55 L.Q. REv. 289, 289
(1939) ("[Flew animals are more prone than bees to furnish lawyers with attractive little
problems .... "), quoted in Bruce W. Frier, Bees and Lawyers, 78 CLASSICAL J. 105, 105
(1983). In Europe, honey was of great importance as a source of sugar. The Louisiana
redactors probably did not consider it so significant because sugar, from sugar cane, was
readily available in Louisiana after the middle of the eighteenth century. See, eg., W.E.
BUTLER, DOWN AMONG THE SUGAR CANE 6 (1980).
30. SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 25, partida third, tit. XXVIII, laws 24-25.
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redactors must have followed the Institutes primarily, perhaps
looking secondarily to the Siete Partidas, which also followed
the Institutes. The drafters of the Siete Partidas (allegedly
Alfonso the Wise) copied the Institutes, sometimes adding sub-
stance that the Institutes did not have.31 Similarly, the Louisi-
ana redactors appear to have looked to and copied the Institutes,
leaving out some parts, just as they may have consulted and left
out parts of the Siete Partidas. But the redactors did look to the
Institutes directly. They did not merely receive the substance of
the Roman law through the prism of the Siete Partidas.
The direct reliance of the Louisiana redactors is shown by
the following passage from the Siete Partidas. In addition to
adding animals not treated by the Institutes, this provision of the
Siete Partidas departs markedly, perhaps even substantively,
from the Roman law governing peacocks and geese. In fact, the
Spanish law legislates the opposite presumptions and conse-
quences from the Roman law:
Men sometimes tame and rear about their houses,
peacocks, sparrow hawks, hens, pigeons, crows, geese, and
pheasants, and other birds wild by nature, wherefore we say,
that the person who reared them will retain his property in
them, wherever they may go, as long as they are accustomed to
go and return to his house: but as soon as they lose the habit of
going and returning, he will lose the property in them, and it
will be acquired by the first person who takes them. And so we
say of stags and does, of zebras and other wild beasts which
men had reared about their houses: for immediately they
return to the woods, and cease to come to the house or place
where they were kept by their owner, he will lose the property
in them.3 2
That the 1808 Code follows the Roman rather than the Spanish
law helps secure Louisiana's claim to direct Roman heirship.
Spanish law adds animals not included in the Roman law-ani-
mals that the Louisiana redactors chose to ignore. The Spanish
law likens geese to animals that are "wild by nature," but the
Louisiana and Roman law say the opposite.3 The Spanish law
lumps peacocks and pigeons with geese, but the Roman and
31. Compare J. INsT. 2.1.14 with StaTE PARTIDAS, supra note 25, partida third, tit.
XXVIII, law 22.
32. SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 25, partida third, tit. XXVIII, law 23.
33. "Ducks and geese are not wild by nature." J. INsT. 2.1.16. "[G]eese, ducks and
other domestic animals, shall not be considered as wild beasts." LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.8
(1808).
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Louisiana provisions use these birds to distinguish34 different
species. 35 This Article does not argue that these differences are
of earth-shattering importance in Louisiana law, or Roman or
Spanish law. But the presence of these differences is significant.
When Louisiana could have followed the Siete Partidas blindly,
the redactors decided instead to look directly to the Roman
source.
Substantively, in fact, the laws of Spain and the laws of the
early Louisiana territory may not have been terribly different.
The next law in the Siete Partidas is probably meant to have a
meaning similar to the provisions in Justinian's Institutes. The
Partidas read:
Hens, capons, and geese, which are hatched and reared
about a man's house, are not wild in their nature. Wherefore
we say, that though they fly and wander away from the houses
of those who reared them, through fear or otherwise, and do
not return; nevertheless the owner does not lose his property in
them: but he may, on the contrary, claim them by action of
theft of any person who takes them, with an intention of
depriving him of them, in the same manner he could any thing
else stolen from his house.36
This provision apparently attempts to follow the Justinian legis-
lation, but it is more confusing and less direct than the Insti-
tutes. It introduces a criterion (being "reared about a man's
house") not contained in the Institutes, and uses this test to dis-
tinguish the geese in this law from the geese in the preceding
law. This departure in method shows again that the Louisiana
Code, in method as well as in language, follows the Roman law
more closely than the Siete Partidas does, and that the Louisiana
redactors must have used the Roman law as a direct source for
the 1808 Code.
Further Roman influence on the 1808 articles will be shown
below.37 Because the texts are not linguistically as similar as
34. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.8 (1808) with J. INST. 2.1.15; compare LA. CIV.
CODE art. 3.20.15 (1808) with J. INST. 2.1.16.
35. Under Roman law, and its progeny, whether an animal was wild was generally
determined by its species, not the individual animal. NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 131.
There were exceptions for animals that were wild by nature but who might have the animus
revertendi (the intent to return, or homing instinct). See J. INST. 2.1.15; G. Inst. 2.68;
NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 131.
36. StETE PARTIDAS, supra note 25, partida third, tit. XXVIII, law 24.
37. A brief discussion of the background in which these doctrines developed must be
given first.
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those quoted above, they will be treated under the discussion of
the parallels between the general possession law of Rome and
Louisiana.
III. SOME PERTINENT ASPECTS OF THE ROMAN LAW OF
POSSESSION COMPARED WITH THEIR
COUNTERPARTS IN LOuIsIANA LAW
A. Painting a 2000-Year Backdrop
So far, a close reading of parallel texts of Roman, Louisi-
ana, French, and Spanish law has highlighted the similarities
and the differences among them. Correlations in language,
method, and perhaps substance between Roman and Louisiana
law, and the discrepancies between Roman law and French and
Spanish law, have shown that Louisiana took much of its law of
occupancy directly from Roman sources. Thus far, deep under-
standing of the law of possession has not been necessary. The
textual analysis from the preceding part of this Article, however,
is not adequate to appreciate the similarities between the law of
possession in Louisiana and Rome. To probe these similarities
more deeply, some exposition of the law of possession is
required.
Possession has been vitally important in the history of
Western law. In Oliver Wendell Holmes's The Common Law,
possession and ownership are treated in the same forty-page Lec-
ture.38 The treatment of ownership consists of two of those forty
pages.39 Holmes states, with little elaboration, that the "rights
of [ownership] ... are substantially the same as those incident to
possession." 4° Why protect possession without ownership?
That question, says Holmes, "has much exercised the German
mind. ' 41 Some of the philosophical complications that stimu-
lated the German thinkers will be explicated below. These com-
plications are important to an understanding of the intent
element of possession under Roman and early Louisiana law.
The first step in understanding Roman law is recognizing
the difficulty of the task. The last law that will be examined
from the Roman period will come from the Justinian legislation,
which was promulgated, for the most part, during the first half
38. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 206-46 (1881).
39. See id. at 245-46.
40. Id. at 246.
41. Id. at 206.
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of the sixth century C.E. Extant Roman law texts are good but
fragmentary. To complicate the task further, Roman law has
been the subject of much thought, speculation, and gloss over
the centuries. These interpretations cannot be ignored in the
name of going back to the original texts, because we do not have
all of the original texts. We need the historians and philosophers
in order to understand what the Roman law meant.
The path is more tortuous because of the vitality of the
Roman law itself during the ancient period. As noted above,
much of the Institutes of Justinian were taken from the Insti-
tutes of Gaius.42 Gaius lived from about 110 C.E. until at least
179.43 The Institutes of Justinian were put together about 400
years later-a considerable period from any civilization's reck-
oning. In that time, much had changed, and much was about to
change more drastically under the Justinian legislation. For
instance, one of the most important legal consequences of pos-
session was the availability of possessory interdicts to protect
that possession.4 Because of a change in procedure,45 a new
remedy provided by the constitutiones" called the actio
momenteriae possessionis rendered the interdicts superfluous.47
Yet both the interdicts and the later actio were important to
Roman law, and the interdicts cannot be ignored because they
were replaced. The Roman period is a long one, and it is not
generally helpful to assume that Roman law was embodied in
either Gaius, the Justinian legislation, or the law at the fall of the
Eastern Roman Empire in 1453.48 The task of examining
Roman law, then, is complex, but it is not impossible.
42. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
43. See Gordon & Robinson, supra note 4, at 9.
44. See infra part III.B.2.
45. See H.F. JoLowIcz, HISToRicAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN
LAW 458-59 (1939).
46. These were laws enacted by the Roman Emperor himself, in the form of decreta,
edicta, and rescnipta or epistolae. The constitutiones of importance here were considered
controlling precedent throughout the Empire. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 312 (6th ed.
1990).
47. See SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 361.
48. This Article, however, will not consider the law of the later Eastern Roman
Empire, generally known as the Byzantine Empire, after Justinian. The redactors of the
Louisiana Code of 1808 probably did not consider it part of the Roman period. In any
case, it does not appear that post-Justinian Byzantine law influenced the early Louisiana
Codes, and for that reason, this Article will ignore later Byzantine law.
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B. Rudiments of the Roman Law of Possession Compared
with Their Louisiana Counterparts
The scheme for this subpart is first to explain basic concepts
in the Roman law of possession. After each concept is
explained, its twin in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 and the
Louisiana Code of Practice of 1825 will be presented. After the
Roman and Louisiana provisions are compared, the ways in
which the law of possession in Louisiana followed the Roman
law will become even plainer.
1. Types of Possessio
There are several types of possession at Roman law, per-
haps the most important of which is good faith possession, gen-
erally known as bonae fidei possessio (the shortened form of
bonae fidei possessio in via usucapiendi ).49 A good faith posses-
sor at Roman law is one who thinks that there are lawful
grounds for his possession, usually a just title.50 A bad faith pos-
sessor, or malae fidei possessor, possesses as owner even though
he knows that he is not the true owner. Louisiana law employed
these same definitions:
There are two sorts of possessors, those who possess <in
good faith>,5 1 and those who possess <in bad faith>.52
The <good faith> possessor is he who is truly master of
the thing which he possesses or who has just cause to believe
that he is so, although it may happen in effect that he is not; as
it happens to him who buys a thing which he thinks belongs to
the person whom he buys it of, and yet belongs to another.
The <bad faith> possessor is he who possesses as master,
but who assumes this quality when he knows very well either
that he has no title to the thing or that his title thereto is
vicious and defective.53
Possessio or possession is distinguished from detentio or
49. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 128 n.2.
50. See SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 67. Louisiana used the same definition for just
title as Roman law: "A just title is one by virtue of which property may be transferred,
such as a sale, a donation and the like, though such title may not in reality give a right to
the estate possessed." LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.68 (1808).
51. The official English version translates "de bonnefoi" as "honestly and fairly." I
have inserted, in angle brackets, what I consider to be a more appropriate translation.
52. The official English version translates "de mauvaisefoi" as "knavishly." I believe
that my bracketed translation is more appropriate.
53. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3.20.21 (1808).
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naturalis possessio,54 which is mere detention, unprotected by
possessory interdicts.5 5 On the other end of the spectrum, pos-
sessio accompanied by the requisites for usucapio 56 is generally
civilispossessio. 7 When all of these requisites are met, it is called
possessio ad usucapionem.5 8 Possession not quite reaching the
level of civilis possessio may still merit possessory protection
through interdicts; this is called possessio ad interdicta .
Physical control, though more than mere detention, was
sometimes called justa possessio when the possession was justifi-
able and not tainted by vitia possessionis (the Roman vices of
possession). For example, one who possessed pursuant to a con-
tract of pledge might be said to exercise justa possessio. ° Ana-
lytically, justa possessio is closer to detention than to possessio,
because it does not include the necessary intent. Nevertheless,
for practical reasons this form of possessio was recognized at
least theoretically and was sometimes even protected by inter-
dicts. The converse of someone's exercising possession pursuant
to a contract is the party on the other side of the contract. Gen-
erally, that person is understood to possess through his contrac-
tual partner. Thus, a lessor possesses through his lessee, who
possesses for the lessor. The lessor's possession was called pos-
sessio corpore alieno.6 The lessee was said to be in possessione
nomine alieno.62 This theoretical problem and the early Louisi-
ana provisions dealing with it are discussed more fully below.63
2. Interdicta
Once someone has a form ofpossessio that the law will rec-
ognize, there are two legal consequences." One is usucapio,65
54. See SAViGNY, supra note 15, at 39.
55. See W.A. HUNTER, A SYSTEMATIC AND HISTORICAL ExPOsrrION OF ROMAN
LAW IN THE ORDER OF A CODE 342 (4th ed. 1903). Some exceptions are given in the
Digest of Justinian. See DIG. 43.16.1.9-.10 (Ulpian, Edict 69).
56. See infra part III.B.3.
57. See HUNTER, supra note 52, at 342. For an exception, see DIG. 41.2.24
(Javolenus, Letters 14).
58. See SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 40.
59. See id. at 39.
60. See id. at 65-67.
61. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 312 (2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREA-
TISE 3d ed. 1991).
62. See J.L. Barton, Animus and possessio nomine alieno, in NEw PERSPECTrVES IN
THE ROMAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 43, 45.
63. See infra part III.B.5.
64. SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 5-7 (collecting contrary authority as well).
65. See infra part III.B.3.
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and the other is protection of possession in the form of posses-
sory interdicts. The interdictum was a procedure by which a
possessor could keep someone else from interfering with his pos-
session. In this procedure, ownership and title were irrelevant.
The requisites for maintaining a possessory interdict could be
broken into two elements: (1) legal possession, and (2) freedom
from the vices of possession. The interdictum lay against only
the immediate dispossessor and not against his successor or
someone who later dispossessed the dispossessor. 66
The Louisiana law was similar. Between two people claim-
ing possession in a possessory action, ownership and title were
irrelevant, as the 1808 Code67 and 1825 Code of Practice 8 say.
Those who had the right to possess, equivalent to the Romanjus
possessionis, "ought to be maintained in their possession and
enjoyment of the thing. ' 69 This right to possess was the substan-
tive right afforded procedural protection by the possessory
action, which was a nominate real action protecting possession
of immovables and real rights therein, whether the possessor had
been evicted or merely disturbed in possession. 0 (Slaves were
considered immovable property for these purposes,7 1 just as they
were considered res mancipi at Roman law.72)
A true owner could not be ousted by a mere possessor, how-
ever, in either Roman or Louisiana law. The owner's remedy in
Roman times was the vindicatio, by which the owner could
recover the property upon proving ownership. Ownership was
often nearly impossible to prove, though, so a possessory inter-
dict was by far preferable to the vindicatio. That proving owner-
ship was no easy task is apparent from the epithet commonly
applied to it, probatio diabolica,73 the devil's proof. Further-
66. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 108-09. The vices of possession will be discussed
below. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. There was an exception in classical
law to the rule that an interdictum lay only against an immediate dispossessor. See
NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 108 n.1.
67. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.26 (1808) ("[w]hich of the two shall be maintained in the
possession, ought to be instructed and decided without examing [sic] into the right of
<ownership>. For the discussion of the titles necessary for deciding the right of <owner-
ship>, demands often delays."). "Ownership" is my translation of the French propridti.
The official English version uses the word "property."
68. LA. CODE PRAc. arts. 53-55 (1825).
69. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.24 (1808).
70. LA. CODE PRAc. arts. 6, 46 (1825).
71. Id. art. 46.
72. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 105.
73. See id at 116 n.2, 155; A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 185 (2 LOUISIANA
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more, the defendant in the vindicatio would be determined by
the winner of the possessory interdict.74
Louisiana law has the same effect. The Code of 1808 pro-
vides that the possessor is presumed to be owner: "until it be
proved that the possessor is not the right owner, the law will
have him, by the bare effect of his possession, to be considered as
such... until the true owner makes out his right. '75  Thus, in
Roman law, a possessor, if dispossessed or disturbed by someone
claiming ownership, could provoke an interdictum. If he pre-
vailed as plaintiff in the interdictum, the person claiming owner-
ship would be obliged to prove his ownership in the vindicatio.
In Louisiana, identical rules apply. Just substitute the words
"possessory action" for interdictum and "petitory action" for
vindicatio. In fact, later Roman law had already made these
substitutions by the time of Justinian's legislation because of a
change of procedure.76
There were several kinds of interdicta.77 The interdictum
utrubi could be used to protect all movables. 78 The plaintiff was
required to prove that he had juridical, but not necessarily
civilis, possessio and that he had exercised that possession during
the current year for a longer period than the defendant, "with-
out force, stealth, or licence" from the defendant.79 The posses-
sion exercised by a party's author in title or someone exercising
possession through the party was included in the calculation,80
so the way in which possession was acquired was important, as it
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 2d ed. 1980) (probatio diabolica); id. § 192 (title "good against the
world") (applying the term to Louisiana law).
74. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 109.
75. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.23 (1808).
76. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
77. See J. INsT. 4.15. Savigny discusses the various interdicta in esoteric detail in
Book IV of his Treatise on Possession. See SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 366-89. He is partic-
ularly concerned with their relation to actiones, a more common Roman remedy. While
interesting theoretically, these considerations are beyond the scope of this Article.
78. J. INsT. 4.15.4a. Only slaves were mentioned in the actual law establishing the
interdictum utrubi, SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 314-15, but this interdictum seems to have
been applied to movables of all types, see J. INT. 4.15.4a; SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 314-
15. Other interdicta could be used to protect the possession of movables under certain
circumstances, but these were of less general importance than the interdictum utrubi, and
this Article will forgo discussing all of them.
79. J. INST. 4.15.4a. The reference to "force, stealth, or licence" will be explained
immediately below.
80. Id at 4.15.6. For instance, if Quintus sells Sextus an estate, Quintus is Sextus's
auctor or author in title.
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was with the other common interdicts.1s
The interdictum utrubi and the other interdicts protecting
movables are the only ones that did not have a parallel under the
Code of Practice of 1825. The Code of Practice refused posses-
sors of movables the same protection allowed possessors of
immovables, although it did consider slaves immovable for this
purpose. 2 Eventually Louisiana law would change to follow the
Roman more closely, allowing possessory protection to a posses-
sor of movables through an innominate real action . 3
For immovables there were several important interdicta at
Roman law. The interdictum uti possidetis 8 4 was used for evic-
tions or disturbances of possession that were less than evic-
tions.8 5 The plaintiff would prevail as long as his own possession
was not tainted by vice. 6 Except for the interdicta utrubi and
utipossidetis, the main forms of interdicta were directly linked to
various vices of possession. The vices were force (vi);
clandestinity or stealth (clam); and precariousness (precario),
that is, pursuant to a license.8 7 Possession did a possessor no
good 8 against someone toward whom his possession was
vicious. For instance, if Quintus gained his possession by forci-
bly evicting Sextus, Quintus's possession would be vicious in
relation to Sextus. Vices of possession, however, are relative, so
that Quintus's possession would be effective in relation to Sep-
timus, a stranger.8 9 The vices of possession, which could prevent
someone from acquiring ownership by acquisitive prescription,
were largely the same under early Louisiana law. Possession
had to be "continued, uninterrupted, peaceable, public and une-
quivocal," essentially the same as nonviolent, 90 nonclandestine,
and nonprecarious, 91 or in Justinian's legislation, "nec vi nec
81. SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 315. The importance of how one acquired the right to
possess, or jus possessionis, became less important by the time of Justinian. Ial
82. See LA. CODE PR c. art. 46 (1825) (slaves treated as immovables); id art. 60
(possessory action did not lie for possessors of movables).
83. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 61, § 308.
84. See J. INsT. 4.15.4a.
85. See SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 310.
86. See id at 313.
87. J. INsT. 4.15.4a.
88. Id.
89. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 108-09. The ancient maxim was, "'Adversus
extraneos etiam vitiosa possessioprodesse solet' (against third persons even a 'vicious' posses-
sion is effective)." Id. at 108-09 n.2.
90. "A possession by violence not being legal, does not confer the right of prescribing
as long as said violence continues." LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.41 (1808).
91. "The circumstance of having been in possession by the permission or through the
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clam nec precario. ' '9 2
The interdicta retinendae possessionis protect possessors
against violent attacks on their possession. These interdicta
could be used to remedy a disturbance, or even to prevent an
anticipated disturbance. They could also be used in a rei vindi-
catlo to determine the legal status of alleged possession, that is,
whether possession was marred by violence.93 The interdictum
de vi was the classical interdict used when possession of an
immovable was lost by violence.94 The plaintiff had to prove:
his possession at the time of the eviction, a forcible disturbance
(atrox vis) possession which rendered possession impossible, that
the violence was committed by the defendant himself, that the
possession was lost by the act of violence, and that the subject of
the possession was immovable.9"
Other interdicts were linked to other vices of possession.
The appropriate interdict when stealth was involved was the
interdictum de clandestina possessione. The plaintiff had to
prove that his juridical possession was lost because the defendant
acquired his possession "behind the back" of the plaintiff. Simi-
larly, when the defendant's possession was precarious, the
interdictum de precario would lie. Although this is the only
important classical interdict for an immovable that no longer lies
under current Louisiana law,96 the action did lie in Louisiana
until the 1982 revision of the Civil Code. Until then, the classi-
cal Roman interdicts had their equivalents under Louisiana law
in the possessory action. Instead of legislating separate posses-
sory actions linked to the various vices of possession, though, the
Code of Practice of 1825 and the Civil Code of 1808 created a
single possessory action that applied to all vices.9 7
3. Occupatio, Usucapio, and Praescriptio
Possession, in addition to affording a possessor access to an
indulgence of another person, gives neither legal possession nor the right of prescribing.
Thus those who possess precariously... possess for [the master]." Id art. 3.20.40; see also
LA. CODE PRAc. art. 48 (1825) (Precarious possessors "are not entitled to the possessory
action.").
92. J. INST. 4.15.4a.
93. See SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 301.
94. See J. INST. 4.15.6.
95. See SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 325-33.
96. There is an exception when the adverse party is the person from whom the pos-
sessor derives his right.
97. See LA. CODE PRAC. ch. 3, § 2 (1825); see also LA. CIv. CODE bk. 3, tit. 20
(1808).
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interdictum or a possessory action, had a second important legal
consequence: by occupatio or usucapio, and later bypraesciptio,
it could lead to ownership. Occupatio allowed the taker of some-
thing that belonged to no one (that something being called a res
nuius) to own it immediately.9" In this area the Louisiana
Code of 1825 matches the Institutes of Justinian very closely,
almost verbatim in places. Because occupatio has been discussed
above at some length, this Article will not treat it further here.99
As for usucapio, although it is simply understood as a civil-
law system of acquisitive prescription, 100 originally its main pur-
pose was to cure technically deficient titles. As an example of
the importance of usucapio, the case of the bonitary owner is
helpful. In classical Roman law a thing was classified as res
mancipi or its opposite, res nec mancipi. The difference, for
present purposes, is that res mancipi could not be conveyed by
the common traditio, but instead had to be conveyed by a formal
method such as mancipatio, a more ritualistic and difficult
method of conveyance. Romans often attempted, however, to
convey res mancipi by traditio, resulting in a technically defi-
cient title in the buyer.101 This defect could be cured by
usucapio.102
Usucapio is a very old institution of Roman law. Defined
by the Twelve Tables01 a around 450 B.C.E., it was limited to
Roman citizens and things capable of Roman ownership. 104
Usucapio required that possession be uninterrupted for the
required period, 10 5 that possession be acquired ex iusta causa or
98. J. INsT. 2.1.12.
99. See supra part II for discussion of occupatio.
100. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 122.
101. A buyer in this particular circumstance is called a bonitary owner, because
although he did not have full, Quiritarian ownership of the thing conveyed by traditlo, it
was understood to have entered his estate, or to be in bonis.
102. This illustration comes from NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 123-25.
103. Id at 105, 122.
104. See J. INsT. 2.6. For a more complete explanation, see G. Inst. 2.65 (although I
do not argue that the Louisiana redactors relied on Gains). The Roman law distinguished
between the ius civile, which applied only to Roman citizens, and the ius gentium, which
applied to all peoples. Advantages of the ius civile were among the reasons that various
groups agitated throughout Roman history for Roman citizenship. It was eventually
extended to all people in Italy, and later extended even further.
Roman or Quiritarian ownership could only be achieved over certain things. The
most important thing capable of Quiritarian ownership was Italian land, later, however, the
privilege of the ius italicum was extended to certain parts of the Empire, and things within
a place enjoying the ius italicum were capable of Roman ownership. See id.
105. Under the Twelve Tables, one year was required for movables and two for
immovables. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 122.
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iustus titulus,10 6 that the possessor be in good faith,107 that the
thing be capable of ownership, 108 and that the thing never have
been stolen or taken by force, unless in the meantime it had been
returned to the owner, or unless the owner could have recovered
the thing but failed to do so.0 9
The plaintiff had to prove all of these elements except good
faith, which was presumed in Roman law, as it is in Louisiana
law.10 The defendant had the burden of proving bad faith at the
time of the acquisition of possession. Supervening bad faith
(e.g., a buyer's discovering after acquiring possession that his
transferor's title was bad) was not an obstacle to usucapio."'
Louisiana had the same rule.12 Also at Roman law, as under
Louisiana law, good faith was required for usucapio or prescrip-
tion, respectively, but not for the possessory protection of an
interdictum or possessory action.113
These parallels between Roman and Louisiana law are
straightforward. To understand the derivation of the Louisiana
law of prescription, though, we must examine the evolution of
this institution in Rome. In time, the most efficient action for a
possessor in via usucapiendi was the actio Publiciana, or Pub-
lician action. This was essentially a vindicatio that presumed the
necessary lapse of time for usucapio; the plaintiff had to prove
the other elements for usucapio, except good faith. He would
prevail unless the defendant asserted the exceptio iusti dominii
(exception that he was the true owner1 4). If the defendant pre-
vailed on his exception, he would win, unless plaintiff asserted
the replicatio rei venditae et traditae. This would allow the
plaintiff to win if he were a mere bonitary owner, even if the
106. Loosely translated "for just cause," this requirement could be met by a bonitary
owner because he had received title through a colorable, but technically invalid convey-
ance. Exactly what could constitute just cause is a complicated issue that is not relevant
here.
107. In Latin, bonae fidei possessio in via usucapiendi.
108. For example, not a free man.
109. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 123. The Romans had a wider definition of
theft than applies in modem times, but land could never be considered stolen. It could be
taken by force, however. Id
110. Id For the Louisiana equivalent, see LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3.20.39, .71 (1808).
111. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 122-23.
112. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.72 (1808).
113. On Roman law, see HUNTER, supra note 55, at 341. On Louisiana law, see LA.
CODE PRAC. art. 49 (1825) (bad faith possessors allowed to bring possessory action), and
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3.20.66-.72 (1808) (good faith required for all but thirty-year
prescription).
114. That is, that he was dominus ex lure Quiritium.
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defendant were the Quiritarian owner. In this way, the Pub-
lician action turned the bonitary owner into a Quiritarian owner
in everything but title."'
Originally, the bonitary owner and the good faith possessor
only had the possessory interdicts for protection on their way to
usucapio. Then, some time in the late Republic, the praetor pro-
tected the bonitary owner against everyone but the true owner.
Eventually, when the praetor (again probably in the late Repub-
lic) instituted the exceptio and replicatio rei venditae et traditae,
the bonitary owner could protect himself on his way to achieving
usucapio, even against the Quiritarian owner" 6
The next development occurred around 199 C.E., when we
find the first existing mention of longi temporispraescriptio. This
device began as a limitation on actions, similar to common-law
adverse possession statutes, but by the time of Justinian, it
became an actual mode of acquisitive prescription. The applica-
ble time periods were ten years if the parties lived in the same
district; otherwise, the prescriptive period was twenty years.
This institution arose because of the limits on usucapio, particu-
larly that it could be applied only to things capable of Roman
ownership. By the time of Justinian, except for the brief period
of reconquest, the Roman Empire no longer included Italy.
Other than in places enjoying the ius italicum, therefore, usu-
capio could only apply to movables.1 1 7
Louisiana, tracing the Roman path, adopted a version of
longi temporis praescriptio. The Code of 1808 allowed a posses-
sor in good faith and with just title to acquire an immovable by
prescription after ten years if the true owner lived in the terri-
tory, and after twenty years if the owner lived abroad." 8 Louisi-
ana apparently followed Rome exactly.
Although the Roman system protected ownership more
than any modem system, the Roman praetor and emperor found
this protection too restraining. Justinian added the longissimi
temporis praescriptio, acquisitive prescription after thirty years.
lusta causa and a thing's status as stolen were irrelevant; only
good faith was required. Louisiana once more followed the
Roman path but strode one step farther. The Code of 1808
115. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 126-27.
116. Id. at 125.
117. Id. at 128-29. For a discussion of the public policies involved, see id at 104-05.
See also supra note 104.
118. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.27 (1808).
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allowed acquisitive prescription of immovables after thirty years,
even if the possessor were in bad faith and had no just title. The
vices of possession could still be pleaded by the defendant.
Thus, Louisiana omitted one Roman requirement: good faith.
Otherwise, the Louisiana and Roman laws were the same.
4. Derivative Possession
Possession did not have to be acquired by the present pos-
sessor but could be acquired through an agent, a slave, or others.
Where positive Roman law specifically allowed it, one possessor
could transfer his possession to another. 119 Some contracts
allowed the transfer of the right to possess (jus possessionis),
such as in pledge and emphyteusis. Others, however, never
involved transfers of thejus possessionis, such as in lease or loan
(commodatum ).120
The Louisiana law has fully embraced the concept of deriv-
ative possession. Louisiana law still recognizes it as an idea in
itself,121 which is also used to ground the concept of "tacking of
possession." Tacking allows Quintus to transfer his possession
to Sextus, whether Sextus is a universal successor or not. As the
Code of 1808 explains:
If a possessor chances to die before he has acquired the
prescription and his heir continues in possession, we join
together the time of the possession of the one and the other and
the prescription is acquired to the heir after the possession of
his ancestor and his own joined together, have lasted the time
regulated for prescribing.
And the same thing holds in the possession of the buyer
joined to that of the seller to whom he succeeds, and in the
possession of the donee and donor, of the legatee and testator,
and in the same manner of all those who possess successively,
having right the one from the other[,] 122
... where they follow one another without interruption.123
Derivative possession has become particularly important follow-
ing the 1982 revision of the possession articles because precari-
ous possessors are now accorded possessory protection.12 4
119. See SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 80-81.
120. Id at 205-24 (going into much more detail than is necessary here).
121. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 61, § 310.
122. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.43 (1808).
123. Id art. 3.20.44.
124. Precarious possessors may now maintain a possessory action. YIANNOPOULOS,
supra note 58, § 300 & n.2.
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5. Precarious "Possession" 125
At Roman law, someone detaining a thing pursuant to a
contract generally had mere detention, not possession. Such
persons were understood to exercise possession for the owner,
who exercised his possession through a tenant, for example.
There were, however, some exceptions for the sake of conven-
ience. Both the pledgee and the sequester (someone who held a
thing that was subject to a dispute until the dispute was
resolved) were considered to have legal possession. In a contract
such as pledge, having the right to possess was essential for the
pledgee to maintain his security; otherwise, detaining the object
would have been nearly useless given the purpose of the agree-
ments involved. 126 Similarly, the sequester could not easily hold
the object secure without having the right to possess. These
cases are exceptional, however. Most detainers generally did not
have possession because they could not have the requisite intent.
The positive law simply dispensed with the intent requirement in
some special cases. 127
Louisiana has followed a similar approach. As the Code of
1808 recognized, "One may possess a thing not only by one's
self, but also by other persons. 1 2  The Code gives some exam-
ples: "[T]he proprietor of a house or other tenement, possesses
by his tenant or by his farmer; the minor by his tutor or curator,
and in general every proprietor by the persons who hold the
thing in his name." 129 Originally, the precarious "possessor"
was not accorded any possessory protection. 130  The Code of
125. The term "precarious possession" does not denote possession in the juridical
sense. The reference to "precarious" comes from the Roman contract ofprecarium, a usu-
ally gratuitous loan of land, which would last forever, with the enormous exception that it
was subject to revocation by the grantor at any time. It is ironic that precarious possession,
which until ten years ago signalled the absence of possessory rights in Louisiana, is named
after the precarium. The Romans understood that thejus possessionis, or right to possess,
was transferred in the contract precarium absent an express agreement to the contrary.
DIG. 9.4.22.1 (Paul, Edict 2); SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 221-24; YANNOPOULOS, supra
note 61, § 319. The use of the word "precarious" does make sense in terms ofprecario, the
vice of possession, which would have defeated a tenant in Rome but generally not someone
holding a precarium.
126. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 110-12 & 112 n.1.
127. The Digest did make the necessary dispensations. Eg., DIG. 9.4.22.1 (Paul,
Edict 18) (pignus and precarium); 43.24.12 (Venuleis, Interdicts 2) (limited protection for
a tenant farmer to regain his crops); see also HUNTER, supra note 52, at 341.
128. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.18 (1808).
129. Id
130. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 61, § 300.
1880 [Vol. 66
POSSESSION
1808, in no fewer than three articles, made this clear, 131 as did
the Code of Practice of 1825.132 In the 1982 revision, however,
precarious possessors were given the benefits of possession
against everyone except the person from whom they derived
their rights of possession. 33 This innovation appears to have
been brought about for reasons of convenience, as in Rome.
C. Some Problems in the Law of Possession: Roman
Treatment and Louisiana Treatment
What has been discussed above is largely susceptible of
black-letter definition. Not everything in the law of possession is
so straightforward, however, and the ways in which the Roman
lawyers and the Louisiana redactors handled these problems,
and the ways that the Louisiana redactors followed the Roman
lawyers, are enlightening. Perhaps the most famous of these
problems is the intent element of possession. Another is the
treatment of incorporeals.
A real right other than ownership, an incorporeal such as
the right of passage, cannot be physically possessed in the same
way that a tract of land can be physically possessed. On a tract
of land someone can build a fence and plant crops and the
corpus of possession is established easily enough. But what
about a servitude of passage? Whether such rights should be
afforded the legal advantages of corporeals troubled Roman law-
yers. Gaius thought incorporeals could not be possessed,
because they could not be touched; thus, the physical element of
possession could not be satisfied. Later, however, Gaius's
approach was abandoned as possessory protection was allowed
for many holders of servitudes. The second section below will
examine how Roman law and Louisiana law evolved in address-
ing this problem.
The element of intent presented other problems. Indisputa-
bly, possession required some intent in addition to the exercise of
physical control-the famous animus in addition to the corpus.
The quality of this animus, however, has been hotly debated.
No one knows exactly what the Romans required. The next sec-
131. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3.20.45-.47 (1808).
132. LA. CODE PRAc. art. 48 (1825) (Precarious possessors "are not entitled to the
possessory action.").
133. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3440 (West Supp. 1991); YIANNOPOULOS, supra
note 58, § 300 & n.2.
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tion will explore how various thinkers have approached the issue
and what the Louisiana redactors concluded.
1. Intent
As we have seen, the mere fact of detaining a thing was not
sufficient to constitute juridical possession. The first element,
certainly, was the exercise of some control, usually actual physi-
cal control. This idea is relatively simple, although actual con-
tact with the subject of possession was not necessary.' This
generally physical element is called the corpus or the factum of
possession. 135 Friedrich K. von Savigny, perhaps the most
important of the modem writers on possession, defines the
corpus as "the immediate power of dealing with a subject," 136
which "is founded on the state of consciousness of unlimited
physical power."' 137 The corpus "need not be . .. a present
immediate power, but it is sufficient if the relation of immediate
dominion over the thing can be reproduced at will, and the Pos-
session is only then lost, when the power to deal with it at will is
altogether gone." 138 This is the generally accepted definition of
the corpus of possession, and no one to my knowledge has seri-
ously disputed it since Savigny explained it.
The second element of possession was intent, or the animus
of possession. According to the Digest, possession is acquired
by acts of the body and the mind, but neither the mind alone nor
the body alone will suffice.139 " 'One acquires possession'... 'by
an act of the mind and an act of the body (animo et
corpore).' "40 Several theories have been proffered to explain
the intent element. Savigny, who articulated the theory that is
the most often discussed, said that the animus possidendi must
amount to more: it must be the animus domini or the animus
sibi habendi, that is, the intent to be owner, or the intent to have
the thing as one's own.'14 This intent means "dealing... as an
owner is accustomed to do," which a robber can do, but a tenant
134. DIG. 41.2.1.21; HUNTER, supra note 55, at 343.
135. See SAVIONY, supra note 15, at 142.
136. Id at 169.
137. Id at 170.
138. Id at 253-54 (citation and footnote omitted).
139. DxG. 41.2.3.1 (Paul, Edict 54) ("Apiscimurpossessionem corpore et animo; neque
per se animo, aut per se corpore").
140. NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 112.
141. SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 71-72. Savigny cites Theophilus for the proposition,
admitting that it is only implied in the Institutes and the Digest. Id at 73 n.(e).
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cannot. 142 This intent should not be confused with the opinio
domini, the belief that one is owner-such a belief is not
required. 143
Not everyone accepts the animus domini definition of
intent. The controversy is mired in the mud of philosophy. As
Holmes said, "[t]he theory [of possession] has fallen into the
hands of the philosophers, and with them has become a corner-
stone of more than one elaborate structure." 14 Bringing the
subject of possession within the will of the possessor was essen-
tial to bringing legal possession doctrine into the framework of
Kantian and Hegelian notions. Both philosophical systems
rested on a respect for individual will, 145 and they conceived of
legal protection of possession as part of the respect for individual
will.
Holmes took issue with this view of the individual will, say-
ing that the common law was sensible in only requiring an intent
to exclude others from the subject of possession. The common
law, said Holmes, did not require an intent to be owner, or ani-
mus domini.'"6 Planiol and Ripert also define animus somewhat
differently from Savigny, saying that "[p]ossession is a state of
fact which consists in the detention of a thing in an exclusive
manner and in the performance on the thing of the material acts
of use and enjoyment as if the possessor were owner."147
Savigny's "subjective theory of possession" 148 probably had
its most famous opponent in Rudolf Jhering 1 49 Jhering concen-
trated on the factual aspects of possession, generally inferring
142. Id. at 73.
143. Id at 177.
144. HOLMES, supra note 38, at 206.
145. See id at 209.
146. Id at 206-34. Special attention should be paid to the text on page 219.
147. 3 M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, TRArr PRATIQUE DE DROIT CML FRANgAIS 158
(2d ed. 1952), quoted in YLANNOPOutLos, supra note 61, § 301 n.5. This Article is not
concerned with the question whether possession is a "state of fact," as asserted by Planiol
and Ripert, a right, or a mixture of the two, but this issue has been disputed and discussed
at length by the possession theorists. See, eg., NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 114-15; SAvI-
GNY, supra note 15, § 5. The redactors of 1808 decided that it was a mixture of the two.
LA. CIV. CODE 3.20.19 2 (1808).
148. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 61, § 302.
149. See generally RUDOLPH JHERING, UEBER DEN GRUND DES BESITZESCHUTZES
(Jen, Hante's Berlay 1869). This work has been translated into Italian, for example, SUL
FONDAMENTO DELLA PROTEZIONE DEL POSSESSO (F. Forlani trans., Milan, Vallard
1872). The French version of JHERiNG, R6LE DE LA VOLONTA DANS LA POSSESSION
(Meulenaere trans., 1891), is rare and unavailable. I have been unable to find an English
translation.
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that the requisite intent would be present when the factual ele-
ments were satisfied. He also would have looked to the cause for
the possession (causa possessionis), opposing and contrasting a
causa detentionis. For instance, a tenant would have a causa
detentionis.I5 0 Jhering thought that the concept of detention
grew from historical exceptions to the notion of possession; if
someone satisfied the physical element of possession, and one of
the historical exceptions (such as lease) did not apply, then Jher-
ing would have found juridical possession.'51
Barry Nicholas finds this interpretation "very forced,"'5 2
and Holmes considered Jhering's philosophy incorrect.153 Yet
Savigny's philosophy did not fare much better. Holmes consid-
ered Savigny "discredited,"' 154 and Professor Nicholas empha-
sizes that Savigny's view of corpus and animus could not be
found in the Roman sources. 55
Louisiana, like other modern jurisdictions, has had to dis-
cern some usable legal structure in this quagmire. Luckily, the
1808 redactors struggled with the problem before the nine-
teenth-century philosophers thrust in their hands. The redactors
seem to have followed the Roman law, or at least what appeared
to be the Roman law as interpreted by Savigny and his school.
The Code of 1808 requires the "intention of acquiring a right of
ownership" in order to achieve ownership by occupancy, 156 and
the prescription articles of the Code actually use the phrase
"animo Domini"' 57 -a verbatim parallel to Savigny's view of
what the Roman possession law was. The Code of Practice
seems to have continued to follow Roman law, making the pos-
sessory action available only to those "who possess as
owners."158
Intent is particularly significant in the Roman and Louisi-
ana systems because possession could be retained by intent
alone, although it could not be acquired by intent alone. Retain-
ing possession in this way was called retention animo solo at
150. See YANNOPOULOS, supra note 61, § 302.
151. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 113 n.1.
152. Id
153. See HOLMES, supra note 38, at 208.
154. Id. at 207.
155. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 113 n.1.
156. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.1 (1808).
157. Id art. 3.20.38.
158. LA. CODE PRAC. art. 47 % 1 (1825).
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Roman law. 159 Possession thus maintained was lost by animus
when the possessor intended to give up possession-at that
"moment." 160 The loss of the requisite intent could be inferred
from mere negligence.1 61 Intent to abandon rendered the thing a
res nuius at Roman law, and likewise in Louisiana the thing
became a thing belonging to no one. Thus, in both systems the
thing became subject to acquisition by occupancy.162
The Roman institution of maintaining possession solely by
intent is also similar to the Louisiana notion of civil possession.
Civil possession allows a possessor to continue to possess even
though he does not continue to exercise physical control. For
instance, if Quintus has the corpus and animus of possession
over a tract of land, then leaves it for some time, his possession
continues through maintaining the requisite intent, even though
he may not be physically on the land. Civil possession, however,
may be ousted by the corporeal possession of another. The arti-
cle in the Code of 1808 that provided the germ of civil possession
allowed the actual possessor to rest on a presumption that he
had possessed from the time when he could prove his possession
until the present time, unless the contrary was proved.16 3
In the final analysis, the Louisiana law on intent seems to
have followed what the Roman law appeared to be. Certainly
the Louisiana law is in line with what Savigny thought the
Roman law was. The conclusion cannot be stated with more
exactitude, however, because we do not know enough about
what the Roman law was.
2. Servitudes
Servitudes, or real fights in land belonging to another per-
son (generally referred to in Latin generically as jura in re or
jura in re aliena, and more particularly as servitudines) show
how Roman law evolved. For a Roman, only corporeal things
could be owned. 64 According to Gaius's Institutes, it was only
logical that one could not possess any incorporeal, including jura
in re aliena,16 5 just as one cannot possess a universality of rights
159. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 113-14.
160. SAViGNY, supra note 15, at 266-67.
161. Id at 270.
162. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3.20.10 (1808).
163. See id art. 3.20.42.
164. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 107.
165. Id at 106.
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(such as a succession) under current Louisiana law. 166 But as
mentioned before, Gaius lived in the second century of the Com-
mon Era, and Roman law was to change considerably between
the time that he wrote and the time that Justinian redacted
Roman law in his famous legislation. 167
Under Savigny's conception, servitudes could not be owned
because they were not property. Animus domini was conse-
quently impossible. Additionally, the corpus was impossible to
hold physically. An analogy, however, could work. Savigny
and the Romans recognized the following relation-possessio
corporis :proprietas ::possessio juris :jus in re. 168 In other words,
just as possession could apply to things capable of ownership
(proprietas, property, or propridtd), quasi-possession 169 could
apply to rights in things (jura in re).170 Thus, while a usufructu-
ary did not possess the land subject to his usufruct, he did quasi-
possess his usufruct.
171
The usufructuary did not have all of these rights at all times
in Roman law, but his lot improved steadily. Eventually, he was
recognized to have a right to quasi-possess (uris quasipossessio)
and he was given possessory protection in the form of the utilis
interdict. 172 At the height of his protection, the usufructuary
could take advantage of most of the chief interdicts, including
the interdicta uti possidetis, utrubi, de vi, and de precario, when
the usual elements of each interdict were satisfied. 173
All of the more important servitudes were eventually
afforded protection through interdicts. Sometimes the same
interdicts that applied to possession proper could be used; for
other servitudes, special interdicts were needed. When defend-
ing an action or an interdict, the holder of a servitude could win
by exception as well.174 Of course this protection for quasi-pos-
sessors was all contingent on the holders' ability to prove the
counterparts to possession: they must have the corpus, meaning
appropriate exercise of the servitude, and the animus, meaning
166. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 61, § 306.
167. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
168. SAVIGNY, supra note 15, § 25.
169. The Latin equivalents are generally quasipossidere (to quasi-possess) or quasi in
possessione esse (to be in quasi-possession).
170. See SAVIGNY, supra note 15, at 76, 131-32 & nn.(c)-(e).
171. Id. § 25.
172. See NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 110.
173. See SAVIGNY, supra note 15, § 47.
174. Id §46.
1886 [Vol. 66
POSSESSION
in this case the animus possidendi instead of the animus domini,
to use Savigny's terminology. 175
The Louisiana redactors in 1808 solved the problem of
incorporeal quasi-possession in the same way that the Romans
eventually did. The Code observes that "[p]ossession can be
properly exercised only on corporeal things," but the Code does
allow that "[t]hings incorporeal may however be said though
improperly to be possessed, such as < servitudes> and the like,
by that kind of possession of which they are susceptible."' 176 The
Code of Practice similarly allowed possessory protection for real
rights in immovables. 77
IV. CONCLUSION
The reader will not see here an apology for Roman law.
The point of this Article is not to argue that Roman law should
be studied because it remains of great practical importance in
Louisiana. (Roman law should be studied for other, better rea-
sons.) The point of this Article is to show that the redactors of
the early Louisiana law relied heavily-and directly in many
places--on Roman law in particular, not just the Romanist-
civilian tradition. Much of this reflection of ancient Roman law
remains in the current law of possession, 17 8 and much of it can
be seen in other parts of the Code of 1808 (such as the parts on
master and servant;179 father and child;18  minors, tutorship,
175. See id Savigny probably meant the animus sibi habendi, the intent to have the
right as one's own. This seems to be the assumption of the 1982 Louisiana redactors at
least. See YANNOPOULOS, supra note 61, § 302 (referring to the "animus rem sibi habendi
(intent to have a things as one's own)").
176. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3.20.17 (1808). The French text of the Code uses "servi-
tudes"; the official English version translates it as "services," but I believe servitudes is a
better translation given current usage.
177. LA. CODE PPAc. art. 47 (1825).
178. In the words of the reporter, the 1982 revision of the Louisiana law of possession
"relied heavily on the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and on Louisiana
jurisprudence" as well as "the reservoir of the civilian tradition." YIANNopouLos, supra
note 61, § 300, at 582-83. The 1870 Civil Code was essentially the same as the 1825 Civil
Code, minus the slavery provisions. The 1825 Code was similar to the 1808 Code; the older
Code was revised somewhat, but the revision was not wholesale by any means. (The 1825
Code had sweeping language about the repeal of prior laws, but this emphatic enunciation
had more to do with the unwillingness of the Louisiana Supreme Court to understand that
colonial laws from the Spanish and other periods were not still in effect.) See generally
Shelp v. National Sur. Corp., 333 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J.) (providing a full discus-
sion and collecting authorities), cert denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Yiannopoulos, supra
note 2.
179. See BATIzA, Actual Sources, supra note 3, at 51.
180. See id. at 53.
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curatorship, and emancipation;181 things and estates;"8 2 and usu-
fruct, use and habitation1 8 3), most of which also appear in differ-
ent incarnations in the present Civil Code. Louisiana's claim to
take directly from the Roman legacy is a good one.
I would be in bad faith, and indeed knavish (to use the 1808
translation of "mauvaise foi "), if I were to assert that Louisi-
ana's case is certain. Although it is styled a "brief," this Article
is of course an exercise in historical research. Overstatement is a
mistake in historical work, which is always uncertain. Part of
the controversy over the sources of the 1808 Code81g is rooted in
the inherent problems of historical research. There can be no
guarantee that the past, be it the couple of hundred years of
Louisiana legal history or the several thousand years of Roman
legal history, will be understood with perfect accuracy. All that
honest historical work can offer is honesty, and one might hope
for some intelligence. In short, responsible history can only
make an honest case.
This Article makes the case that the Louisiana law of pos-
session for the most part follows the Roman law. The Article
further emphasizes that the redactors did not depend only on
later sources, such as the Siete Partidas or French commenta-
tors, for their knowledge and use of the Roman law. The nearly
verbatim reproduction of Roman provisions in the Code of 1808
shows this, particularly when compared with the variance of the
Siete Partidas and other possible intermediate sources. The case
is further strengthened because the early Louisiana law also fol-
lowed general Roman methodology and doctrine. Louisiana
need not take through Spain or France, at least insofar as the
possession articles are concerned. For the foregoing reasons,
Louisiana should be recognized as a direct successor to the
Roman legacy.
181. See id. at 55.
182. See id. at 62-63.
183. See id at 65.
184. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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